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UNLEASHING CABLE T.V., LEASHING THE
FCC: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF PAY
TELEVISION
I. Introduction
In 1975, the Federal Communications Commission, acting under
its rulemaking authority,' issued a series of regulations , prohibiting
1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151-609 (1970).
2. The relevant portions of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1977) are as
follows:
Cable television system operators or channel leasees engaging in origination or access
cablecasting operations for which a per-program or per-channel charge is made shall
comply with the following requirements:
(a) Feature films shall not be cablecast by a cable television system subject to the
mandatory signal carriage requirements of Subpart D of this part, except as provided
in this paragraph.
(1) A feature film may be cablecast if-
(i) The film has been in general release in theatres anywhere in the United States
for three (3) years or less prior to its proposed cablecast;
(ii) A conventional television broadcast station licensed in the market of the cable
system holds a present contractual right to exhibit the film. For purposes of this
subparagraph, a television station affiliated with a television network will be deemed
to hold a present contractual right to exhibit a film if the network to which it is
affiliated holds such a right;
(iii) The film has been in general release in theaters anywhere in the United States
for more than ten (10) years prior to its proposed cablecast and the film has not been
exhibited in the market of the cable television system over conventional television for
three (3) years prior to its proposed cablecast. Once a film has been cablecast in the
market pursuant to this subparagraph, or broadcast on a subscription basis pursuant
to § 73.643(a)(1)(iii), such film may thereafter be cablecast in the market without
regard to its subsequent exhibition over conventional television;
(iv) The film is in a foreign language;
(2) Feature films otherwise excluded by this paragraph may be cablecast upon a
convincing showing to the Commission that they are not desired for exhibition over
conventional television in the market of the cable television system, or that the owners
of the broadcast rights to the films, even absent the existence of subscription television,
would not make the films available to conventional television.
(b) Sports events shall not be cablecast live by a cable television system subject to
the mandatory signal carriage requirements of Subpart D of this part except as pro-
vided in this paragraph.
(1) A specific event may be cablecast if the event has not been broadcast live over
conventional television in the market of the cable television system during any one of
the five (5) seasons preceding the proposed cablecast. If a regularly recurrent event
takes place at intervals of more than one year (e.g., summer Olympic Games), the
event shall not be cablecast if it has been broadcast live over conventional television
in the market during any one of the ten (10) years preceding the proposed cablecast.
(2) New specific sports events that result from the restructuring of existing sports
shall not be cablecast until five (5) seasons after their first occurrence. Thereafter,
subscription cablecasts shall be governed by paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
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pay cablecasters from showing certain types of programming, on the
rationale that pay cablevision, through successful competitive bid-
ding, would "siphon" this programming away from broadcast televi-
sion and thus deprive the general public of popular programs.' Fif-
teen suits challinging these regulations were consolidated and
argued before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,4
decided by that court in March, 1977, not only set aside the rules
limiting pay cable programming, but also limited the FCC's general
authority to regulate pay cable. Additionally, the opinion painted
a "new perspective on ex parte contacts with a rather broad juris-
(3) The number of non-specific events which may be cablecast in any given season
shall be determined as follows:
(i) If less than twenty-five (25) percent of the events in a category of non-specific
events were broadcast live over conventional television in the market of the cable
television system during each of the five (5) seasons preceding the proposed cablecast,
the number of events in the category cablecast shall not exceed the number of events
in the category not broadcast in that season among the preceeding five (5) seasons
when the largest number of events in the category were broadcast.
(ii) If twenty-five (25) percent or more of the events in a category of non-specific
events were broadcast live over conventional television in the market of the cable
television system during any one of the five (5) seasons preceding the proposed cable-
cast, the number of events in the category cablecast shall not exceed fifty (50) percent
of the number of events in the category not broadcast in that season among the
preceding five (5) seasons when the largest number of events in the category were
broadcast. However, if the number of events in the category to be broadcast in the
current season is a reduction from the number of events broadcast in that season
among the preceding five (5) seasons when the largest number of events in the category
were broadcast, the number of events in the category which may be cablecast pursuant
to this subparagraph shall be reduced in proportion to the reduction in events broad-
cast.
(d) Not more than ninety (90) percent of the total cablecast programming hours shall
consist of feature films and sports events combined. The percentage calculations may
be made on a yearly basis, but absent a showing of good cause, the percentage of such
programming hours may not exceed ninety-five (95) percent of the total cablecast
programming hours in any calendar month.
(e) No commercial advertising announcements shall be carried on subscription chan-
nels during such operations except before and after such programs for promotion of
other programs for which a per-program or per-channel charge is made.
Id.
Subsection (c) of section 76.225, which forbade the cablecasting of any series type of
program with interconnected plot or the same cast of characters as had been broadcast over
conventional television, was deleted by the FCC in Second Report and Order, 35 RAD. REG.
2d (Pike & Fischer) 767 (1975).
3. See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1 (1975).
4. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 Sup. Ct. 111 (1977) [hereinafter HBO].
NOTES
prudential brush."' The court's ruling has drawn sharp criticism in
subsequent opinions.5 This Note will examine the history behind
this decision, the court of appeal's treatment of the FCC rules, and
the decision's possible effect on future pay cable regulations.
II. Background
Until 1927, "the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the
private sector, and the result was chaos."' The government discov-
ered that the broadcast frequency spectrum was a scarce national
resource, and decided that its ownership should be kept in the pub-
lic domain.7 Otherwise, "[w]ith everybody on the air, nobody could
be heard."8 From 1927 to 1934, the Federal Radio Commission allo-
cated frequencies among competing applicants.' Finally, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission was created in 1934 to grant
broadcast licenses in a manner "consistent with the public interest,
convenience, or necessity."'10
Since its inception, the FCC has developed rules which have
sought to ensure that licensees would be responsive to the public
trust placed in them, while preserving the licensees' first amend-
ment rights." Generally, actual entertainment programming for-
mats have been left to the discretion of the licensee and competitive
market forces." Instead, FCC regulations have centered on areas
such as the Fairness Doctrine, 3 or the news and community pro-
5. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereafter
ACT].
5.1. See notes 120-41 and accompanying text infra.
6. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
8. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
9. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969), which reviews the
early history of broadcast regulation.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970).
11. See Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The Broadcast-cable
Controversy, 44 Cin. L. J. 427 (1975). See also National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC,
420 F.2d 194, 207, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1969); Comment: FCC Broadcast Standards
for Ascertaining Community Needs, 5 Fordham Urb. L. J. 55 (1976).
12. Notice of Inquiry in re: Development of Policy Re: Changes in the Entertainment
Formats of Broadcast Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976). See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); FCC Programming Policy Statement, 25 F. Reg. 7293 (1960).
13. The Fairness Doctrine requires that the broadcast media allocate equal time to oppos-
ing political viewpoints. The FCC points to spectrum scarcity to justify its application. The
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to enforce the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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grams and services which all licensees are obligated to provide."
The present controversy concerning the FCC's power to regulate
pay cable was germinated in 1952, when the first application to
establish a subscription broadcast television (STV) service was filed
with the Commission.' 5 This application in effect asked the FCC to
reserve one or two precious channels in the broadcast spectrum for
special programming which would be paid for per program or per
channel by the viewer. The FCC did not grant a license to any such
STV applicant until 1959, when it announced it would license a
limited number of trial stations in order to gather more information
about the effects of STV on the broadcast medium." By 1968, the
FCC had made a thorough analysis of this trial, and on the basis of
the results allowed STV to continue with certain limitations.'7
The concern of the Commission and of opponents of STV through-
out the trial run was that STV would pull popular programming
away from the free networks and restrict its viewing to those few
who were willing -and able to pay." Thus, in 1968, the Commission
promulgated rules" designed to minimize the effects of such
"siphoning."'" The rules also were structured to ensure that sub-
14. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
15. 20 F. Reg. 988 n.1 (1955). Both subscription broadcasting (STV) and cable program-
ming charge the viewer for receipt of a channel showing first-run motion pictures, sports
events, and other programs not shown on conventional television. STV is available on the
UHF/VHF broadcast spectrum. Pay cable programming requires initial installation of a cable
hook-up for which there is an additional monthly charge. The basic cable hook-up usually
provides better picture reception, as well as news, public access channels, and some original
programming.
16. See Third Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959), aff'd, Connecticut Comm. Against
Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962). The Commission actually
granted two licenses, only one of which, WHCT in Hartford, Connecticut, became operational
in the summer of 1962. 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 467 (1968).
17. 15 F.C.C.2d at 556.
18. Id. at 493.
19. See 15 F.C.C.2d at 508-09 and 556-72, in which the rules and their rationale are set
out at length. Briefly summarized, they restricted STV from showing: 1) feature films more
than two but less than ten years old; 2) any sports programs which had been shown regularly
on free television in that community within two years; and 3) week-to-week series programs.
(The series rule was repealed by Second Report and Order, - F.C.C.2d - , 35 PAD. REO.
2d (Pike & Fischer) 767 (1975)). Commercial advertising was also prohibited, and total
programming could not consist of more than 90% feature films and sports programming. See
notes 68-69 infra for the rationale behind these two rules.
20. 15 F.C.C.2d at 556-72. The 90% and no-advertising rules were not justified by the
"siphoning" rationale, but were intended to promote diversity and unique formats. See notes
68-69 infra.
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scription television would provide a distinct type of programming
not available on free television, thereby justifying allocation of
channels on the broadcast spectrum." The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld these rules when they were challenged on
constitutional and anti-competitive grounds in National Associa-
tion of Theatre Owners (NATO) v. FCC.22
The STV rules were developed under the FCC's general authority
to regulate the broadcast television spectrum, but cable television
is not within this spectrum. 23 Community antenna television
(CATV) originated in the 1940s to transmit distant signals by
coaxial cable to communities not able to receive good broadcast
reception. 2 It has expanded today into a cable system which has the
capability of carrying 35 or more channels, some re-transmitting
network programs and others providing inter alia original program-
ming, public access stations, stock market reports, and news.25 Be-
cause cable television takes up no part of that "scarce national
resource," the broadcast spectrum, the rationale which allowed the
FCC to regulate STV appeared at first glance to be inapplicable.
The FCC made no major effort to regulate CATV until 1960,6
when it began to assert limited jurisdiction over cable to prevent
CATV's conflict with broadcast television in carriage and non-
duplication of programming.Y The Commission's authority to regu-
late cable in these areas was upheld by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co.25
21. 15 F.C.C.2d at 556-72.
22. 420 F.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). In NATO, the FCC's power
to authorize STV was challenged by theatre owners who would be competing with STV in
showing first-run films. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FCC
had the requisite authority both to license STV and to regulate it so that it would not conflict
with free television. The court said that "competition among those providing broadcasting
services in a given area would best protect the public interest." 420 F.2d at 203. As to the
constitutional arguments raised, the court said that licensing STV did not discriminate
against the poor (id. at 205-07) and the rules restricting STV "create[d] far less risk [than
other regulations previously upheld] of diminishing the debate on vital public issues." Id.
at 208. The rules did not affect the ideas which could be presented on STV; they only served
to "ensure the continuing economic vitality of free television." Id.
23. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
24. 567 F.2d at 21-22.
25. Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. at 8-9. N.B.: Citation to briefs of the'
various parties consolidated with Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC will be abbreviated in the
manner supra, with docket numbers provided when necessary for identification.
26. See generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 164-66 (1968).
27. Id.
28. ' 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Southwestern Cable held that the FCC had the right to regulate
1978]
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After Southwestern Cable the FCC held further proceedings, 9
and in 1969 issued additional cable regulations and requirements."
However, it declined at that time to apply the STV rules3' to cable
in the absence of data indicating a threat of siphoning by cable
television.2 Nine months later the FCC abruptly reversed itself and
adopted the STV rules for pay cable with little explanation.3 While
there was no new data to suggest a danger of siphoning, the FCC
justified the rules as preventive medicine for a possible future
harm .3  Proponents of pay cable aver that the FCC had reversed
itself upon the urging of broadcast interests that regarded cable as
a threat to their hegemony.35 These rules as modified in subsequent
orders 31 were attacked in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.
III. Arguments against the Rules
Numerous arguments were raised on all sides against the pay
cable rules set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 76.225. Broadcast interests, while
favoring broad regulation of cable television, attacked the rules be-
cause they allegedly promoted and encouraged the development of
pay cable beyond the "supplementary service" role which compet-
cable transmissions to prevent cable stations from bringing distant signals into an area when
this might pull viewers away from local broadcasting stations carrying the same programs.
See notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra.
29. Informal rulemaking proceedings held by the FCC generally consist of a published
notice to implement new rules, followed by submission by interested parties of their views
and supportive data. Additionally, the Commission at its option may conduct discussions and
hear formal arguments. For a general discussion of informal rulemaking, see 1 K. Davis,
ADMINIsTRATVE LAW TREAISE § 6 (1958). See also ACT, 564 F.2d at 470-71.
30. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
31. See note 19 supra.
32. 20 F.C.C.2d at 204.
33. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970). This short release was
concerned primarily with petitions to overturn FCC original programming requirements.
Tacked on to the opinion denying those petitions were three sections dealing with requests
for further regulation of cable, including adoption of siphoning and advertising rules. The
FCC acquiesced to free television interests in adopting the cable rules, but made no effort in
the single paragraph of the opinion devoted to this issue to explain why it had changed its
stance. It simply announced that it was doing so. Id. at 827-28.
34. Id. at 828 n.6.
35. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. at 48-54.
36. The rules were modified by First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1 (1975) (making
several insubstantial changes) and Second Report and Order, - F.C.C.2d - , 35 RAD.
REG. 2d (Pike and Fischer) 767 (1975) (deleting the restriction against series programming.
See note 2 supra).
NOTES
ing broadcast networks envisioned for it."7 On the other side, cable
television groups and the Department of Justice, among others,"
argued that the rules exceeded the Commission's statutory author-
ity, were arbitrary and unsupported by factual findings, discour-
aged competition between communications media, and violated the
First Amendment."' The court of appeals, in a lengthy opinion dis-
secting these arguments, found that the challenged regulations were
"arbitrary, capricious, and unauthorized by law" insofar as they
related to cable television." The rules were set aside.4'
A. Held: The Rules Are Unauthorized by Law
Since cable is not within the broadcast spectrum and since its
carriage capabilities, while not limitless, are more vast than those
of broadcast television, the court of appeals opined that "the Com-
mission must either demonstrate specific support for its actions in
the language of the Communications Act or at least be able to
ground them in a well-defined and consistently held policy devel-
oped in the Commission's regulation of broadcast television
... ."42 The court of appeals agreed that the FCC has some author-
ity to regulate cable as set forth in Southwestern Cable43 and in
United States v. Midwest Video Corp.," but stated that "these cases
establish an outer boundary to the Commission's authority. .... ,,45
Additionally, "the Commission can act only for ends for which it
could also regulate broadcast television."' 4
37. See Brief for Petitioner American Broadcasting Companies at 22-24, No. 75-1788,
consolidated with No. 75-1280.
38. A partial listing of interested parties included: Home Box Office, American Television
and Communications, Manhattan Cable, Teleprompter, Columbia Cablevision, Viacom In-
ternational, Warner Cable, Motion Picture Association of America, Metromedia, Columbia
Pictures, United Artists, M-G-M, National Association of Broadcasters, American Broadcast-
ing Companies, Columbia Broadcasting Co., National Broadcasting Co., Professional Base-
ball, Forward Communications, National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, Twentieth
Century Fox and American Mother's Committee. Petitioner Home Box Office lists an addi-
tional 74 groups and individuals who filed comments or testified at the F.C.C. proceedings
in favor of cable interests. Reply Brief for Home Box Office at A-1.
39. See Briefs for Petitioner Motion Picture Association of America, No. 75-1555, and for
Petitioners Home Box Office et al.
40., 567 F.2d at 18.
41. Id.
42. 567 F.2d at 28.
43. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
44. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
45. 567 F.2d at 28.
46. Id.
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In Southwestern Cable7 the FCC, pending a hearing, had re-
stricted petitioner's cable television expansion into the San Diego
area, where its programming would conflict with the local broadcast
station." Southwestern Cable Company challenged the FCC's au-
thority to issue such an order. In upholding the Commission's order,
the Supreme Court recognized only a limited FCC power:
[Tihe authority which we recognize today . . .is restricted to that reason-
ably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various res-
ponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The Commission
may, for these purposes, issue "such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law," as "public conveni-
ence, interest, or necessity requires." We express no views as to the Commis-
sion's authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or
for any other purposes."
Midwest Video, in a plurality decision,50 narrowly upheld the
Commission's authority to require cable television to telecast origi-
nal local programming in addition to intercepting and retransmit-
ting broadcast signals.5 The Court found the rule requiring original
programming
no different from Commission rules governing the technological quality of
CATV broadcast carriage. In the one case, of course, the concern is with the
strength of the picture and voice received by the subscriber, while in the other
it is with the content of the programming offered. But in both cases the rules
serve the policies of §§ 1 and 303(g) of the Communications Act on which
the cablecasting regulation is specifically premised . . . .In sum, the regula-
tion preserves and enhances the integrity of broadcast signals and therefore
is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." 2
Neither decision, however, apparently went so far as to give the FCC
authority to dictate which programs could not be carried on pay
cable and yet could be carried by broadcast television.
47. 392 U.S. 157.
48. Id. at 160.
49. Id. at 178 (citations omitted).
50. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
51. See First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969). The FCC regulation challenged
in Midwest Video provided that "no CATV system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall
carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the system also operates to a
significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities for local produc-
tion and presentation of programs other than automated services." 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a)
(1969).
52. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 669-70, citing Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 178.
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The court of appeals stated that the FCC should confine its cable
rulemaking authority within the same limitations as are imposed on
its broadcast rulemaking. It then sought to define these boundaries
to see if they encompassed regulation of program format and con-
tent.53 Support for the FCC authority to regulate cable format could
be found, as the court of appeals noted, in Citizens Committee to
Save WEFM v. FCC.5" According to the HBO court, WEFM held
that "the Communications Act not only allows, but in some instan-
ces requires, the Commission to consider the preferences of the pub-
lic, and the Commission in discharging this authority must regulate
: . . entertainment programming. . .. "' Thus, the WEFM opin-
ion would support anti-siphoning rules, "since the end to be
achieved-protection of preferred television service for those not
served by cable television-would also justify regulation of the
broadcast media.""6 Ironically, the court did not allow the WEFM
opinion to serve as a basis for the anti-siphoning rules because the
FCC itself had not followed that opinion.57 The Commission rejected
the WEFM position that it had statutory authority to regulate
broadcasting entertainment formats.58 Therefore the court con-
cluded that the Commission could not be allowed to regulate cable
in an area in which it was unwilling to regulate broadcast televi-
sion. 5 Had the Commission phrased its position differently-for
instance, "We have the authority, but choose to exercise it only in
appropriate circumstances"-perhaps the court might have found
that the FCC had the requisite authority. The FCC here is hoist
with its own petard: if it refuses to accept and exercise authority
over one medium, it then may not arbitrarily choose to exercise that
authority over a competing medium.
53. 567 F.2d at 29-30.
54. 506 F.2d 246 (1974) (en banc). In WEFM, a citizens group sought to vacate an FCC
order allowing WEFM Radio to change its format from classical to contemporary music. The
court observed that where such a change might diminish the diversity of programs available
in a locale, public hearings must be held before any such request could be granted. Id. at
261. If further held that the FCC had authority to regulate entertainment formats to preserve
the public's interest in a particular format. Id. at 260.
55. 567 F.2d at 30.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 31.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 31, 34.
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B. Held: The Rules are Arbitrary
The court of appeals may overturn only those federal agency ac-
tions which are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. . . ."" Under these criteria,
the government agency must show a "rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made."' Pay cable interests con-
tended in HBO that the "anti-siphoning" rules were based on a
supposition (that siphoning would occur) wholly unsupported by
facts or evidence, and hence, arbitrary." The FCC rebutted this
argument by saying that protection of the public interest demanded
preventive measures to avert the potential ill effects of siphoning
before they are actually felt." The FCC and network competitors
feared that cable would be able to out-bid the networks on rights,
for instance, to the Super Bowl, the World Series, or a blockbuster
movie and thus keep the large majority of Americans who lack pay
cable from enjoying those events. 4 The only concrete examples the
FCC provided to support this supposition were the closed-circuit
theatre televising of various boxing matches and of Evel Knievel's
abortive attempt to leap the Snake River. 5 The court of appeals
found these examples, buttressed only by the networks' speculative
statistics, insufficient to support the regulations.6
Additionally, the court found specific sections of the rules to be
without a rational basis in established evidence. The pay cable rules
found to be the most arbitrary were those concerning the televising
of motion pictures, 7 the "90-percent" rule,6 and the ban on com-
mercial advertising.6 9
60. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
61. 567 F.2d at 35.
62. See Reply Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. at 5-17.
63. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C. 2d 825, 828 (1970).
64. See 52 F.C.C.2d at 49-50.
65. 567 F.2d at 37.
66. Id. at 36-38.
67. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a). See note 2 supra for full text of rule. In his dissenting statement
to the 1975 regulations, Commissioner Robinson pondered the 3 to 10 year movie rule: "What
is the significance of three and ten? Well, of course, the number ten is important for it is
precisely the number of fingers on a human's hands. The number three is similarly important
to the three-fingered sloth." 52 F.C.C.2d at 75 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
68. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(c) (1975). See note 2 supra. The "90-percent" rule prohibited pay
cable from exhibiting a programming content more than 90% of which was devoted to films
or sports. The Commission intended that the 10% remaining should be filled with other types
of programs, thus encouraging diversity. See also 52 F.C.C. at 66.
69. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(d) (1975). See note 2 supra. The ban on advertising was promul-
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NOTES
1. Motion Pictures
When cable interests pointed out that there was no appreciable
diminution of public interest in a good movie, and that therefore it
could not be "siphoned" to the detriment of the free television audi-
ence,70 the networks responded that the rules prevented delay in the
public's viewing of the product." Thus, when the anti-siphoning
rationale failed, the rule was justified as an anti-delay mechanism.
However, the court of appeals noted that uncontradicted evidence
showed "the popularity of film material does not decline with an
increase in the interval between first theatre exhibition and first
television broadcast."72 The court found no evidence which would
support the purported time-delay purpose of the film regulations.
2. The 90-Percent Rule and the Ban on Advertising
The court likewise found the "90-percent" rule and the ban on
commercial advertising to be without basis.73 While these rules were
upheld as applied to STV,74 that decision was made within "the
context of a need to allocate scarce spectrum resources . . . .Such
an allocation problem [was] clearly not involved in this case. '"75
Therefore, the court held that "[wlithout further explanation of
the function these rules are meant to serve, we cannot affirm the
Commission's authority to promulgate them.""
gated by the FCC with the intent of encouraging diversity and unique program content. It
was felt that without commercials, cable would not be subject to the same pressures to
produce bland programming of mass market appeal, but could gear itself to special interest
groups. See 52 F.C.C. at 66. Cable interests agree with this contention, and in fact did not
challenge the ban on advertising. See Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. Rather,
they pointed out that one of the unique features of pay cable is its freedom from commercial
advertising and resultant creative restraints. Id. at 8-11.
The court of appeals, however, envisioned that cable could develop "some combination of
user fees and advertising [which] might make subscription cable television available to the
poor. 567 F.2d at 40. The court noted that the ban on advertising was carried over from
the STV rules "not because of its intrinsic merit, but only because no one objected too much."
Id.
70. Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. at 63-64.
71. Id. at 64. See also Brief for Intervenor American Broadcasting Companies at 28, No.
75-1280.
72. 567 F.2d at 39.
73. Id. at 34.
74. NATO v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1969).
75. 567 F.2d at 34.
76. Id.
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3. Sports Events
The FCC averred that "[m]ost parties agree that some restric-
tions are needed to insure that the quantity and quality of sports
events now shown over conventional television is not diminished by
subscription operations."77 An audience is far less interested in
viewing a football or hockey game where the outcome is already
known-such an event can be shown effectively only once.
This view was supported by Commissioner Robinson, who had
disagreed with the movie siphoning rules.7" It was also, surprisingly,
supported by Professional Baseball, intervenor in the case. 9 One
would have supposed that baseball would take a stance similar to
that of the Motion Picture Association of America in opposition to
rules which would limit its viewing outlets and, consequently, its
income. 0 However, while Professional Baseball asserted its standing
to intervene partly on its interest in negotiating with pay cable to
televise additional games,8' it evidently did not consider the existing
rules a barrier to such negotiations .8 Nevertheless, the court of ap-
peals vacated the sports rules for lack of concrete supporting evi-
dence 3 as well as on first amendment grounds.8 The court sup-
posed, in partial justification of its ruling, that cable firms which
had purchased exhibition rights would then sell those rights to
broadcast stations in areas not served by cable. Thus there would
not be a complete blackout of the event on free television.8 5 In spite
of these arguments, it seems possible that a modified anti-siphoning
rule for specific sports events might be upheld," provided it were
77. 52 F.C.C.2d at 57.
78. Id. at 81 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
79. See Brief for Intervenor Professional Baseball, No. 75-1280.
80. See Brief for Petitioner MPAA, No. 75-1555, consolidated with Nos. 75-1280 et al.
MPAA opposed the movie siphoning rules, which would cut into the market for its members'
product.
81. Brief for Intervenor Professional Baseball at 4.
82. Id. at 16.
83. 567 F.2d at 37.
84. See discussion infra at section D.
85. 567 F.2d at 39. the FCC regarded this supposition as unfounded: "When any part,
however small, of the audience within the reach of a broadcast station's signal has access to
cable service, then the court's assumption about cable operators' willingness to share broad-
cast rights fails." Brief for Petitioner FCC at 27, FCC v. Home Box Office et al., Supreme
Court Docket Nos. 76-1724 et al.
86. However, the FCC has apparently discarded all of the cable rules, including those for
sports, and does not appear inclined to resurrect them in modified form. See 42 F. Reg. 64,349
(Dec., 1977) (revoking the pay cable rules). The House sub-committee on communications
issued on June 7, 1978 a proposal which would eliminate almost completely federal regulation
of cable television. 46 U.S.L.W. 2690 (Media Law Reporter, June 27, 1978).
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coupled with adequate waiver provisions and procedures so that
"material not broadcast would be readily available to cablecasters,
and viewers." '
C. The Anti-Competitive Argument
While anti-trust regulation is not the bailiwick of the FCC, the
court found that the Commission had taken anti-trust considera-
tions into account in its proceedings.8 In spite of this, cable inter-
ests, supported by the Department of Justice," charged that the
rules were designed to stymie the growth of a new medium in order
to protect existing broadcast interests." The court of appeals
seemed to find merit in this argument"[t]he Commission has in no
way justified its position that cable television must be a supplement
to, rather than an equal of, broadcast television. . . .[Tihe Com-
mission has failed to crystallize what is in fact harmful about
'siphoning'." 9' The court did not "perceive any public benefit to be
achieved by hobbling cable television to correct the sort of unfair
competition alleged by the Commission. 91 2
Nevertheless, the court restricted its ruling on this issue to a
requirement that the FCC provide an adequate record to justify its
anti-competitive regulations. 3 This record must show factual find-
ings assessing the effects of its rules on competition. 4 However, the
court's opinion does not appear to be a complete bar to regulations
having an anticompetitive result, if that result comes only as a
necessary side-effect of legitimate regulatory goals.
D. Held: The Rules Violate The First Amendment
Cable interests and supporters argued that the rules were a prior
restraint on free speech, that they were overbroad as well as arbi-
87. See 567 F.2d at 49, n.95, and at 50-51 for discussion of waiver provisions.
88. Id. at 40-41.
89. 567 F.2d at 42-43. Note that the Department of Justice supported the cable group on
the anti-trust issue despite its position as a statutory defendant.
90. Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. at 48-54.
91. Id. at 36.
92. Id. at 42. The Commission complained that cable competition was unfair because
local broadcasters had to pay copryight royalties on programming, while cable could rebroad-
cast the same programs without such payment. The court of appeals rejected this argument,
noting that the Supreme Court has found that cable's free use of broadcast signals served
the cause of promoting availability of the arts. Id. at 41-42.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id. at 42-43.
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trary, and that the material prohibited was a form of expression
protected by the First Amendment. 5 United States v. O'Brien"
articulated the Supreme Court's criteria for permissible government
interference with first amendment rights:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified [1]
if it is within the constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers
an important or substantial government interest; [3] if the government
interest in unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'7
Applying the third criterion, the HBO court found that the rules
were not intended to suppress free expression per se.S They did not
proscribe the content of speech itself, but were similar to regulations
affecting the time, place and manner of speech.9 The court found,
however, that the other criteria of O'Brien had not been met, and
consequently held the rules unconstitutional.' 0 The FCC lacked the
power to promulgate the "90-percent" and no-advertising rules,' 0'
and "[niot only do [these rules] serve no 'important or substantial
. . .interest,' they serve no purpose which will withstand scrutiny
on this record."'02 The sports and motion picture regulations were
similarly rejected on this ground, since the FCC had failed to estab-
lish a valid threat of siphoning.' 3 The court doubted that the FCC's
"interest in preventing delay of motion picture broadcasts could be
shown to be important or substantial on any record" '°-effectively
barring the possibility of passing a modified movie rule in the fu-
ture. ,05
95. See Briefs for Petitioners Home Box Office et al. and for Petitioner MPAA. MPAA
argued that "(o)ne who erects a podium near an auditorium and engages in speech of his own
(e.g., pay cable) may not be restrained because he thereby detracts from the public appeal
of and audience for those speaking inside the auditorium (e.g., conventional television)
.. " Reply Brief for Petitioner MPAA at 6.
96. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
97. Id. at 377 (numbering added).
98. 567 F.2d at 48.
99. Id. at 47-49.
100. Id. at 49-50.
101. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
102. 567 F.2d at 49-50 citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
103. 567 F.2d at 50. "Where the First Amendment is concerned, creation of such a rebutt-
able presumption of siphoning without clear record support is simply impermissible." Id. at
51.
104. Id. at 50.
105. For example, the rule might have been modified to exclude the ban on dubbed
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Finally, the court, applying the O'Brien guidelines, held that,
even if the need to prevent siphoning could be' established, the
rules were grossly overbroad and went further than necessary to
achieve that purpose. Since the regulations were a prior restraint
on speech, they could be sustained only "where the proponent of
the restraint can convincingly demonstrate a need."'' 7 Thus, the
same regulations could be upheld and reaffirmed by the court of
appeals as they applied to STV because the FCC had made a con-
vincing demonstration of the need to regulate the use of the broad-
cast spectrum.'
E. Ex Parte Contacts
The court of appeals in its Home Box Office opinion also consid-
ered the complaint by amicus Henry Geller' ° that the FCC rule-
making proceedings had violated the ex parte communications doc-
trine enunciated in Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United
States."0 Sangamon Valley held that ex parte contacts (i.e., infor-
mal contacts, or lobbying, between interested parties and FCC
members outside the informal proceedings) vitiated the Commis-
sion's action in informal rulemaking proceedings."' The decision
forbade submission of off the record contentions in proceedings allo-
cating television channels to particular communities."'
foreign language films, or on films less than 10 but more than 3 years old which had been
exhibited by conventional television for 3 years prior to cablecast. Such a permutation might
conceivably make the rule more closely fitted to its alleged purpose.
106. 567 F.2d at 51.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 59-60. See also NATO v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194. The court of appeals specifically
held that NATO foreclosed first amendment objections to the STV rules. 567 F.2d at 59.
However, the court did not explain why rules could be overbroad and could serve no rational
purpose for pay cable, and yet be narrow enough and rational enough for STV. The court also
enunciated a higher standard for would-be STV petitioners than for cable petitioners: STV
must demonstrate that a rule was "patently unreasonable, having no relationship to the
underlying regulatory problem." Id. at 60.
However, in the wake of HBO, the FCC has deleted the STV movie rules, 42 F. Reg. 62,372
(1977), and issued a proposal to delete the other STV rules so that rules for STV would
conform to those for cable. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, F.C.C. No. 77-813 (Dec. 7, 1977).
Whether this will result in the rebirth of STV remains to be seen.
109. 567 F.2d at 51. Geller is a former FCC general counsel, and was an attorney on the
brief for petitioner in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
a case which raised the same ex parte contacts issue. See notes 125-316 and accompanying
text infra.
110. 269 F.2d 221 (1959), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
111. 269 F.2d at 224-25.
112. Id.
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An incomplete list supplied to the HBO court by the FCC indi-
cated eighteen ex parte contacts by broadcast interests, nine by
cable, and ten by sports and movie interests between the close of
oral argument and the adoption of the rules." 3 Neither these nor
other contacts were fully documented and made public,"' thus
giving adversary interests no opportunity to respond."5 The court
said that since the FCC had possibly based its rules and regulations
on information garnered from these contacts and yet failed to pro-
vide their substance to the court, judicial review was frustrated.
Additionally, the contacts destroyed the efficacy of adversarial
discussion" 6 and were inconsistent with "fundamental notions of
fairness implicit in due process . ... "'Giving these reasons, the
court enunciated a new rule that
once a notice of proposed rule-making has been issued . . . any agency offi-
cial or employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the
decisional process of the rule-making proceeding, should 'refus[e] to discuss
matters relating to the disposition of a [rule-making proceeding] with any
interested private party . . . prior to the [agency's) decision . . .. 1'
Further, the court said that if ex parte contacts do occur, any writ-
ten material passed, as well as a summary of the meeting, must be
placed on public file so that interested parties might respond.,
This sweeping rule has been criticized.' 0 Never before had an
agency been required to keep such stringent records in the informal
113. 567 F.2d at 53.
114. Id. at 52 n.108.
115. Id. at 55.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 56.
118. Id. at 57 citing Exec. Order 11920, 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRSS. Doc. 1040 (1976).
"Executive Order 11920 which the [HBO] opinion ... adopts as an overarching principle
of administrative law, is an executive branch prohibition of ex parte contacts with White
House staffers regarding international air route allocations when such route certifications are
before the President for approval." ACT, 564 F.2d at 474. The ACT court did not view this
as sufficient basis to sustain the ex parte rule. See notes 125-36 and accompanying text infra.
119. 567 F.2d at 57.
120. See notes 122-41 and accompanying text infra. Support might be found in the writ-
ings of commentators, however:
At present [the procedures used in rulemaking] provide neither a satisfactory frame-
work for agency decision making nor a structure to those decisions that would ease
judicial review. . . .If rules, like formal adjudications, were based on clearly defined
records, the efficiency of both rulemaking and judicial review would be increased.
Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 39 (1975).
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(as opposed to formal) rulemaking process.' Furthermore, its lan-
guage applies to any informal rulemaking proceeding, regardless of
the interests involved. Two months after the HBO decision was
handed down, Circuit Judge MacKinnon filed a special concurring
opinion which would limit the rule postulated to cases which in-
volved "competitive interests of great monetary value"' and which
were essentially an "adjudication of the respective rights of the
parties vis-a-vis each other.' ' 23 The judge said that he "would not
make an excessively broad statement to include dictum that could
be interpreted to cover the entire universe of informal rulemaking.
There are so many situations where the application of such a broad
rule would be inappropriate that we should not paint with such a
broad brush.12
4
Shortly thereafter, the ex parte contacts argument was raised
again in Action for Children's Television v. FCC. 5 The petitioner,
ACT, contended that the behind closed doors negotiation between
the FCC and the television industry "undermines the administra-
tive process since it denies public participation at every stage of the
regulatory process when issues of critical public importance are con-
sidered, frustrates judicial review, and renders the extensive
comment-gathering stage 'little more than a sop . . ."" ' The
ACT court2 7 concluded that, although ex parte contacts had been
made outside of the formal and informal public proceedings,'1 the
FCC had met the procedural requirements set forth by Congress. "9
That court, dealing with HBO's prohibition of ex parte contacts,
agreed with Judge MacKinnon that the rule enunciated in HBO
"should not apply-as the opinion would clearly have it-to every
case of informal rulemaking."3 0
121. See Rules Governing Ex Parte Communications, 1 F.C.C.2d 49 (1965); Rule Making
Procedures, 30 F. Reg. 9277 (1975).
122. 567 F.2d at 62. (MacKinnon, J., concurring specially).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
126. Id. at 468.
127. The three-judge panel in this case consisted of two circuit judges, Tamm and Wilkey,
neither of whom participated in the HBO decision, plus Circuit Judge MacKinnon, author
of the special concurring opinion which would limit that HBO ruling. See notes 122-24 supra
and accompanying text. The opinion in ACT was filed by Circuit Judge Tamm.
128. 564 F.2d at 469.
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)(Supp. V 1975). See also 564 F.2d at 470-71 n.19.
130. Id. at 474.
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The A CT court would limit the ex parte contact rule to quasi-
judicial proceedings involving resolution of "competing claims to a
valuable privilege."' 3' In contradiction to HBO's implied presump-
tion of agency irregularity,'32 the ACT court opined that "ex parte
contacts do not per se vitiate agency informal rulemaking action,
but only do so if it appears from the administrative record under
review that they may have materially influenced the action ulti-
mately taken.' ' 33
The HBO ruling was criticized additionally for its tenuous basis
in legislation 3' and in previous holdings. 3 However, the A CT court
did not specifically overrule HBO's ex parte rule: it held only that
the ruling should not apply retroactively to the instant proceedings
"inasmuch as [the rule] constitutes a clear departure from estab-
lished law when applied to informal rulemaking proceedings
''136
The HBO ex parte rule has raised other problems which now face
the FCC. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order 37 released a month
after ACT v. FCC, the issue of ex parte contacts was raised yet
again. Petitioner Citizens for Cable Awareness in Pennsylvania
(CCAP), citing HBO, filed a request to stay effectuation of a new
class of cable rules until all ex parte contacts had been reduced to
the record. 38 The Commission was in doubt, despite ACT v. FCC,
as to whether the HBO opinion should apply retroactively to all
proceedings already concluded. 39 It queried whether the decision
should apply just to competing claims for a valuable privilege, and
not generally to legislative rulemaking, and additionally whether
proceedings should be reopened on any evidence of ex parte con-
tacts, regardless of whether the contacts influenced the proceed-
ing. "' The Commission set aside these questions pending the Su-
131. Id. at 477, citing HBO, 567 F.2d at 64 (MacKinnon, J., concurring specially).
132. 567 F.2d at 51. The HBO court said, "a reviewing court cannot presume that the
agency has acted properly [when it fails to disclose relevant information presented to it]
. . . but must treat the agency's justifications as a fictional account of the actual decision-
making process and must perforce find its actions arbitrary." Id. (citations omitted).
133. 564 F.2d at 476.
134. See 564 F.2d at 474 and note 118 supra.
135. 564 F.2d at 475.
136. Id. at 474.
137. 65 F.C.C.2d 644 (July 24, 1977).
138. Id. at 645.
139. Id. at 646.
140. Id.
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preme Court's disposition of HBO. The Court denied certiorari,
however, and so the questions remain.
IV. Conclusion
The Home Box Office decision was a resounding victory for cable
television interests, and a defeat for broadcasters which would see
cable only as a supplement to conventional television. Whether
broadcasting's dire predictions of siphoning will come to pass re-
mains far in the future. Should a cable system manage to acquire
the exclusive rights to the Olympics or a Super Bowl game, the
public outcry might be loud enough to move Congress to give the
FCC authority to act, at least in the area of sports event telecasting.
This possibility has not been barred by the HBO opinion. But the
movie rules, the 90-percent rule and the ban on advertising effec-
tively have been barred from future modification by the court's
holding that they were unconstitutional.'
The Federal Communications Commission also has been greatly
affected by the disaffirmance of its cable rules. Its authority to
regulate cable television apparently has been limited to areas in
.which cable would conflict with broadcast television. Furthermore,
the Commission is drastically affected by the court's ex parte con-
tacts rule. It will require further adjudication to clarify the depth
and scope of this pronouncement. The Supreme Court may hear
another case that is not so inextricably intertwined with other is-
sues. Until that occurs, however, the FCC and other government
agencies which hold informal rulemaking proceedings have a sweep-
ing and confused mandate with which to comply."'
Jo Ann M. Becker
141. Id.
142. But see note 100 supra.
143. The FCC is currently attempting to promulgate ex parte contact rules in keeping
with the HBO decision, as modified by ACT (if in fact ACT did modify HBO-a problem
about which there seems to be some confusion. See note 139 and accompanying text supra).
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